Social Norms 2.0: From Private Governance to Co-Evolution

Grisel opens by revisiting the central claims of the private governance literature.Building on the work of Robert Ellickson, Elinor Ostrom, and others, this tradition emphasized the capacity of close-knit groups to resolve disputes and sustain cooperation through informal norms, reputational sanctions, and decentralized monitoring.These scholars showed that communities can often achieve efficient outcomes without state law or formal institutions-a powerful corrective to overly legalistic accounts of order.Yet Grisel demonstrates that the Prud'homie does not fit this model.In Marseille, norms were neither universally shared nor self-enforcing.They did not provide clear guidance in the face of new fishing technologies, ecological pressures, or growing commercialization.As he writes: "The normative background shared by the fishers did not provide ready-made answers : : : Without the rule-making activities of the Prud'homie, the fishers were left to discuss their compliance with social norms ad infinitum" (151).Norms required interpretation, stabilization, and adaptation through institutional means.The Prud'homie's emergence in the fifteenth century thus illustrates a fundamental point: private governance requires organization.Norms do not govern themselves.