Reasons as Evidence and the Asymmetry Charge

Abstract This essay raises a novel objection against Kearns & Star’s (Kearns S. and Star D. 2008. ‘Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?’ Ethics 119(1), 31–56; Kearns S. and Star D. 2009. ‘Reasons as Evidence.’ Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4: 215–42.) influential account of normative reasons – the Reasons as Evidence (short: RaE) view. The RaE view’s basic idea is that normative reasons can be analysed in terms of another concept, namely evidence for ought-propositions. This view, I argue, faces an ‘asymmetry charge’. That is, evidence for ought-propositions and reasons relate differently to (potential) ought-facts and behave differently in our deliberations about what we ought to ‘do’ (in a broad sense, including action and belief). On the one hand, normative reasons, if sufficiently strong, are connected to a determinate ought (statement). On the other hand, evidence for ought-statements, even if strong and assessed correctly, can be misleading. I consider potential replies to the alleged asymmetry of reasons and evidence for ought-propositions – either accommodating it or explaining it away. These replies, based on different (perspectivist and objectivist) accounts of ‘ought’, however, are inconsistent with the RaE view – or so I argue. This essay focuses on epistemic normativity, i.e. on reasons and oughts that are concerned with beliefs (not actions). I think, however, that similar arguments could be made about cases of practical normativity (concerned with action) as well.