Arguing for a “broader” view of metonymy in word-formation

Abstract Various works on metonymy in word-formation do not agree on to what extent word-formation has a metonymic basis. The proponents of the “broad” view claim that metonymy is a mental process inherent in coining (almost) all words, while the proponents of the “narrow” view restrict its application to specific forms only, expressing their concerns that the unrestricted application of metonymy in word-formation would make the notion vacuous. The present paper argues for a “broader” view on the basis that metonymy is seen primarily as a mental process based on a relationship between a motivating and a named concept, the former providing mental access to the latter. This does not mean, however, that all complex words have a metonymic basis. Complex words that are variations on existing lexemes, such as variation driven syntactically, e.g., transposition, or pragmatically, e.g., diminutiveness, refer to the same concept as the derivational base, so we cannot speak of a relationship between two concepts. The resulting form with which the named concept is expressed is irrelevant as it solely depends on the formal means a language offers. The paper cannot thus claim that typologically different languages (e.g., synthetic languages with predominant suffixation versus analytic ones with predominant compounding) make use of cognitive processes to a different extent since they only use different formal means for the same purpose.