The verification of the dismantlement of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme: lessons for future unilateral or multilateral disarmament initiatives

Abstract South Africa’s disarmament provides the only practical experience of attempting to verify the quantity of fissile material produced outside of international safeguards. This experience is particularly instructive about the promise and problems of verifying disarmament. In this paper, we interrogate the technical aspects of the dismantlement of the programme and identify possible processes and lessons that could be applicable in future unilateral or multilateral disarmament initiatives. This may also provide some clues as to whether post-facto verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) affords credible assurance that a State has indeed complied with its disarmament undertaking. Placing an emphasis on accounts by participants in the programme’s development, dismantlement, and verifiable disarmament, this paper provides a uniquely South African perspective from which to examine the challenges of verification. The South African experience may assist in supporting the development and strengthening of practical and effective measures for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.