Federalizing the Fireable Offence – The AG’s Autonomous Concepts Move in the Bulgarian Central Bank Case

This post seeks to analyze the AG’s approach in his Opinion in Case C-611/24 that treats the removability test applicable to national central bank officials as an autonomous concept and argue for a broader implication this approach may bring.

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Publication Details

Published
2026-04-17
DOI
https://doi.org/10.21428/9885764c.b1f2c457
Primary Topic
Global Financial Regulation and Crises
Type
article
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article

Federalizing the Fireable Offence – The AG’s Autonomous Concepts Move in the Bulgarian Central Bank Case

Jinlin Hu
Global Financial Regulation and Crises
article

Federalizing the Fireable Offence – The AG’s Autonomous Concepts Move in the Bulgarian Central Bank Case

Jinlin Hu
article en

Abstract

This post seeks to analyze the AG’s approach in his Opinion in Case C-611/24 that treats the removability test applicable to national central bank officials as an autonomous concept and argue for a broader implication this approach may bring.

Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Global Financial Regulation and Crises
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