Does Practical Wisdom Solve the Moral Knowledge-Action Gap?

This paper examines the Aristotelian foundations of the neo-Aristotelian Phronesis Model (APM) (Darnell et al., 2019; Kristjánsson & Fowers, 2024) in light of its claim to resolve the moral knowledge-action gap. The paper argues that the APM departs from Aristotle’s moral psychology by construing phronesis as having an action component. On Aristotle’s account, practical wisdom culminates in prohairesis (reasoned choice or decision), not necessarily in action itself. Rather than rejecting the APM, the paper shows that Aristotle’s own conception of phronesis offers other resources, some of which are acknowledged by proponents of the APM but not integrated into the model. Revisiting Aristotle’s writings brings into view the interpretive, collective, and political dimensions of practical wisdom. These factors help to understand better how wise moral decisions may, or may not, be enacted in concrete social contexts.