Towards asymmetrical decentralisation as federal arrangement for Lebanon

Introduction This paper examines the potential adoption of asymmetrical federal arrangements within Lebanon’s unitary system to better accommodate its diverse and pluralistic society. While federalism is often discussed in relation to deeply divided societies, its application within formally unitary states remains underexplored in the Lebanese context. Methods The study adopts a conceptual and comparative approach, analyzing the notions of federalism and asymmetry in relation to ethnic and religious pluralism, while tracing Lebanon’s institutional evolution and drawing on relevant comparative experiences. Hence it aims to set a theoretical basis for few main rules of the game for federal arrangements and discuss their applicability for Lebanon. Results The findings show that Lebanon has historically exhibited de facto forms of asymmetrical federalism, though with uneven and often unstable outcomes. They further indicate that decentralization, when constitutionally embedded rather than treated as a purely administrative tool, can function as a mechanism for managing diversity and improving governance. Discussion These results suggest that integrating asymmetrical federal elements within a unitary framework may enhance institutional effectiveness in Lebanon. The study contributes to broader debates on governance in plural societies by demonstrating how federal principles can be selectively adapted to fit context-specific political and social dynamics.