Vpliv svetovalcev za pooblaščeno glasovanje na ceno delnic podjetja

Proxy-advisory firms, most prominently Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, shape how institutional investors vote on corporate matters.Because their recommendations are often followed in bulk, critics warn of "one-size-fits-all", conflicts of interest, and other controversies, while proponents view them as cost-efficient information intermediaries.Prior studies show that advisory guidance materially sways voting outcomes, but evidence on related valuation effects remains inconclusive.This thesis addresses that gap by reviewing the regulatory setting, business models, and controversies surrounding proxy advisors, summarizing existing capital-market findings, and directly testing the market-pricing channel.Using a hand-collected sample of 100 shareholder meetings with publicly verifiable advisor stances and final votes, a two-stage event study is conducted.Short-horizon Cumulative abnormal returns and longer-horizon Buy-and-hold abnormal returns capture immediate shocks and slower adjustments.Across all windows, stock-price reactions are statistically indistinguishable whether shareholders follow or disregard proxy-advisor guidance.Welch t-tests confirm no significant differences between the two groups.Patell standardized-residual tests show a small but significant negative short-term swing in both "follow" and "disregard" cases, suggesting investors respond more to the agenda items than to the decision to follow advice.