Research on Incentive Mechanisms for Green Production Markets—The Case of the Chinese Passenger Vehicle Industry

To explore the evolutionary dynamics of green product markets under bounded rationality, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, passenger vehicle enterprises, and consumers, using China’s new energy vehicle (NEV) market as a case study. By integrating system dynamics with real-world data and policies, the paper simulates strategy evolution paths and identifies equilibrium conditions. The results show a unique evolutionarily stable strategy: the government refrains from regulation, enterprises actively produce NEVs, and consumers actively purchase green products. The government’s strategy is primarily influenced by enterprises, while enterprises’ strategy is mainly driven by consumers. Numerical analysis reveals that when the premium payment ratio of green products (price difference relative to conventional vehicles) is controlled between 27.27% and 31.82%, the market evolves most rapidly toward the ideal equilibrium. Furthermore, when the additional positive benefit ratio of green consumption falls below 36.36%, market formation and development are severely hindered; raising this ratio to 40.91% yields significant promotion effects, beyond which marginal benefits diminish. These findings provide quantitative benchmarks for policy design and strategic decision-making to foster self-sustaining green product markets.