Mandate Without Protection: UN Peacekeeping, Command Fragmentation, and the Politics of Non-Intervention in South Sudan

Civilian protection in UN peacekeeping often fails not because of mandate absence, but because mandates, command structures, and political incentives pull in conflicting directions. The concept of mandate without protection captures this gap between formal commitment and operational reality. Moving beyond a descriptive account, the manuscript examines the protection of civilians (POC) in UN peacekeeping, focusing on the interaction between mandate design, military capability, and the politics of non-intervention in South Sudan, situated within broader debates on African political order, state formation, and institutional design. Focusing on South Sudan, with comparative reference to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Bosnia, the study addresses three interrelated questions: how troop-contributing country caveats, national interests, and fragmented command structures within UNMISS undermine coordinated POC responses even when atrocities occur within operational range; what sequence of institutional failures produced the mission's non-response to the July 2016 Terrain Hotel attack, and what this reveals about the gap between mandate, capability, and political will; and under what conditions UN Security Council dynamics—particularly the strategic and economic interests of P5 members—override protection commitments. Methodologically, the study combines archival analysis of UNMISS force disposition records, rules of engagement documentation, and internal after-action reports with interviews involving UNMISS military and civilian leadership. It further incorporates comparative analysis of MONUSCO's failure in Kiwanja (2008) and UNPROFOR in Srebrenica (1995). The contribution lies in clarifying how formal protection commitments can be undermined by institutional fragment