Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Recycling in the Context of a Carbon Cap and Patent Licensing

A wave of large-scale retirement of power batteries is gradually approaching, and the patent licensing conditions for remanufacturing retired power batteries present opportunities for third-party recycling manufacturers to emerge. Considering both the carbon-emission benefits of power battery recycling and the intellectual property disputes, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model with third-party recyclers and battery manufacturers as players. It examines the costs and utilities of stakeholders involved in the reverse logistics process of power battery recycling under carbon quotas, accounting for patent licensing, and analyzes key parameters and participant strategy choices. The research indicates: (1) when the volume of waste power batteries is significant, third-party recycling manufacturers tend to choose direct battery disassembly; (2) at higher carbon prices within the carbon market, third-party recycling manufacturers are more likely to adopt remanufacturing strategies; (3) lower patent licensing fees combined with higher patent maintenance costs help battery manufacturers secure greater profits and encourage third-party recycling manufacturers to engage in battery remanufacturing activities.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Sustainability
Published
2026-04-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3390/su18083867
Primary Topic
Sustainable Supply Chain Management
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Recycling in the Context of a Carbon Cap and Patent Licensing

Chao Wan, Zhenhua Gao, Mengmeng Zhu
Sustainability
Sustainable Supply Chain Management
article

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Recycling in the Context of a Carbon Cap and Patent Licensing

Chao Wan, Zhenhua Gao, Mengmeng Zhu
article en

Abstract

A wave of large-scale retirement of power batteries is gradually approaching, and the patent licensing conditions for remanufacturing retired power batteries present opportunities for third-party recycling manufacturers to emerge. Considering both the carbon-emission benefits of power battery recycling and the intellectual property disputes, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model with third-party recyclers and battery manufacturers as players. It examines the costs and utilities of stakeholders involved in the reverse logistics process of power battery recycling under carbon quotas, accounting for patent licensing, and analyzes key parameters and participant strategy choices. The research indicates: (1) when the volume of waste power batteries is significant, third-party recycling manufacturers tend to choose direct battery disassembly; (2) at higher carbon prices within the carbon market, third-party recycling manufacturers are more likely to adopt remanufacturing strategies; (3) lower patent licensing fees combined with higher patent maintenance costs help battery manufacturers secure greater profits and encourage third-party recycling manufacturers to engage in battery remanufacturing activities.

SustainabilityVol. 18(8)
Anhui University of Technology (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 12%
Sustainable Supply Chain Management
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Recycling in the Context of a Carbon Cap and Patent Licensing — Chao Wan, Zhenhua Gao, et al. · Sustainability (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS