Anaconda Strategy for Managing the Strait of Hormuz Vulnerability and Endogenous Power Transition

This paper introduces the Anaconda Strategy, a multi-period framework designed to reduce the strategic vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz (approximately 20.9 million barrels per day, accounting for 20–25% of global petroleum trade). The strategy seeks to induce the structural destabilization and endogenous collapse of the Iranian regime while avoiding abrupt energy shocks to vulnerable economies.The proposed model integrates three core components: (i) an infinite-horizon repeated game with asymmetric information and dynamic screening; (ii) a multi-commodity minimum-cost flow optimization model (linear programming) incorporating variable geopolitical risk premiums; and (iii) asymmetric incentive mechanisms grounded in incomplete contracts theory and fortress erosion models.Results demonstrate that the targeted gradual pressure approach significantly outperforms the current Nash equilibrium, yielding a discounted payoff of 𝑉∗_Anaconda = 160 compared to 𝑉∗_unilateral = 60 (with discount factor 𝛿 = 0.95). Operations research simulations confirm that Hormuz dependency can be reduced to ≤10% with a risk premium of ≥8 USD/barrel, accelerating the erosion of Iranian oil revenues from approximately 40 billion USD per year to the critical threshold of 8 billion USD within 6–9 years (versus 20 years under the baseline scenario).Keywords: Repeated Game Theory, Operations Research, Smart Sanctions, Multi-Commodity Flow Optimization, Endogenous Power Transition, Strait of Hormuz, Fortress Erosion Models.