From strategic voters to strategic options: Recasting strategic voting for multiparty simple plurality elections

Research on strategic voting in simple plurality systems has focussed largely on voters faced with three options. This is problematic, first because strategically minded voters may prefer candidates outside of the three leading contenders; second, they may consider voting for third (or worse) placed parties; and third, some voters might have more than one strategic option. We demonstrate that conceptualising strategic voting in terms of strategic voters restricts our ability to accurately answer important questions about strategic voting. We set out a new approach to strategic voting which identifies the strategic options available to voters in multiparty contests. We then examine the number, distribution and character of strategic options and strategic votes in four British general elections using data from the British Election Study. We find that across these four elections 7% of options open to voters could be considered strategic and more than one third of these were voted for, accounting for 11% of all votes cast.