A system-of-systems approach to nuclear disarmament verification through the lens of Kazakhstan’s experience

Abstract Modern nuclear weapons systems include complex interdependency between technological, regulatory, organizational, and political factors yet it has largely been the case with respect to traditional disarmament verification methods that focused largely on material accountancy and discrete monitoring activities. The existing verification practices are not able to adequately cover these complex interlinkages, thereby constraining their capacity to ensure comprehensive disarmament compliance. This research introduces a System-of-Systems Approach that views nuclear disarmament verification as the result of interactions among many interconnected systems, helping to explain how effective verification emerges from their coordination. Using System-of-Systems Approach, the study maps nine core subsystems and explores feedback dynamics that influence compliance and potential diversion. This framework is applied to Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet disarmament trajectory as an empirical case, analyzing feedback mechanism that influenced verification performance throughout three decades. Through causal loop diagramming, this study identifies four reinforcing feedback cycles and two stabilizing mechanisms that together shape overall system behavior. These findings emphasize verification’s nature as an evolving, responsive framework rather than a fixed technological solution. This analysis demonstrates the necessity for comprehensive verification approaches that recognize systemic interconnections, informing discussions regarding Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) operationalization.