Deference and Advice

Reasons of partiality are typically seen as reasons to give our intimates priority over strangers. In his most recent work, however, Samuel Scheffler cautions against an exclusive emphasis on partiality and the reasons it provides. He introduces a new type of relationship-dependent reasons that he thinks we should take more seriously: reasons of deference. In this paper, I critically engage with Scheffler’s claim that reasons of deference amount to a distinct hallmark of intimate relationships. I argue that reasons of deference need to be complemented by another type of relationship-dependent reason: reasons to provide advice to one’s intimate. After showing what such reasons involve, I demonstrate that they function as important barriers that protect us from unjustifiedly deferring to the reasons of our intimates. Conversely, our reasons for deference can protect us from being overly critical of our intimates and thereby advising them poorly.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Journal of Value Inquiry
Published
2026-04-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-026-10087-8
Primary Topic
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Deference and Advice

Monika Betzler
The Journal of Value Inquiry
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
article

Deference and Advice

Monika Betzler
article en

Abstract

Reasons of partiality are typically seen as reasons to give our intimates priority over strangers. In his most recent work, however, Samuel Scheffler cautions against an exclusive emphasis on partiality and the reasons it provides. He introduces a new type of relationship-dependent reasons that he thinks we should take more seriously: reasons of deference. In this paper, I critically engage with Scheffler’s claim that reasons of deference amount to a distinct hallmark of intimate relationships. I argue that reasons of deference need to be complemented by another type of relationship-dependent reason: reasons to provide advice to one’s intimate. After showing what such reasons involve, I demonstrate that they function as important barriers that protect us from unjustifiedly deferring to the reasons of our intimates. Conversely, our reasons for deference can protect us from being overly critical of our intimates and thereby advising them poorly.

The Journal of Value Inquiry
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Philosophical Ethics and Theory
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