Research on collaborative game of scientific and technological achievements productization based on “administrative committee + enterprise” mode from the perspective of CPSS

The productization of scientific and technological achievements in high-tech industrial parks is a key link in promoting the deep integration of the innovation chain and the industrial chain. However, this process involves complex interactions among multiple actors, with intertwined risks and unclear governance mechanisms. Based on the CPSS perspective and grounded in evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a game model among high-tech industrial parks, park technology enterprises, and academic research institutions. It focuses on analyzing the impact of the “administrative committee + enterprise” model on CPSS risk management and multi-stakeholder governance, and further examines its influence mechanism on the game equilibrium of the productization of scientific and technological achievements in high-tech industrial parks. The findings indicate that the productization of scientific and technological achievements in high-tech industrial parks is a process of coordinated interaction among three parties. The park promotes the organic linkage of the physical, information, and social components in CPSS through support measures such as technology maturation investment, market engagement organization, policy implementation, and digital management, thereby achieving systematic governance among multiple actors and accelerating the productization process. As the core of transformation, park technology enterprises drive the transition from technology to products through strengthened R&D and model iteration. Academic research institutions, as the source of technology, address implementation challenges through achievement openness and collaborative transformation. In addition, different support measures show significant differences in their impact mechanisms on CPSS risk management and game equilibrium. Technology maturation investment and digital management exhibit a “threshold-driven” effect, promoting the evolution of the game from a non-cooperative equilibrium to a stable cooperative equilibrium through a dual “technology—management” trust mechanism. Market engagement and policy implementation present an “inverted U-shaped” effect through institutional incentives and coordination mechanisms, where optimal cooperation strategies exist only at moderate levels. Government special subsidies display a “switch-type” threshold effect, where crossing a critical value can rapidly activate multi-actor collaboration.