What Is a Flame? On the Ontology of Sensibles in Plato’s <i>Timaeus</i>

Abstract We are all familiar with flames, but what are they, really ? Plato’s account of the ontology of sensibles in the Timaeus is notoriously controversial. The “traditional” interpretation holds that sensible entities are particulars, across the dialogue. By contrast, “reconstructionists” maintain that the ‘new beginning’ (48e2) heralds an argument whereby sensibles are proposed to be repeatable characteristics. My paper offers a novel case for traditionalism. Specifically, I argue that, at 48e2ff., we find an account of sensible particulars as consisting of co-located, non-repeatable, non-persistent property-instances, each existing at exclusively one region of the Receptacle at one time. The form of traditionalism I advocate fits better with the text than the rival versions of the view and avoids the objections raised by reconstructionists.