Guo Xiang's Value Monism

Abstract: This article places the thought of the Neo-Daoist philosopher, Guo Xiang 郭象 (ca. 252–312 c.e.), within contemporary value theory. It does so in order to claim that Guo, in his commentary upon the Daoist classic, the Zhuangzi 莊子, offers a novel form of value monism, the view that there is only one basic, ultimate, or fundamental value. Guo's value monism differs from the versions of the position presently available insofar as it claims that while there is only one basic value, all other, nonbasic values somehow are this value as well. To make sense of this claim, I situate Guo within the contemporary debate between value monism and value pluralism in order to show how he offers not an existence or priority value monism, but instead what I call a "one-all value monism." I conclude by emphasizing the therapeutic motivation for Guo's metaphysical and axiological views.