Institutional Logics and Corporate Financial Reporting Quality: Does CEO Authority Concentration Matter?

This study examines the association between CEO authority concentration and financial reporting quality within the framework of institutional logics. Using a panel of publicly listed firms from three Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, over the period 2015–2023, we employ panel regression models to analyze how concentrated CEO authority shapes financial reporting outcomes. The concentration of CEO authority is measured using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) based on the CEO’s positions in key board committees. Our findings indicate that higher CEO authority concentration is associated with lower financial reporting quality. This result suggests that when CEOs hold dominant positions within board committees, the effectiveness of internal monitoring mechanisms may weaken, increasing managerial discretion over the financial reporting process. As a result, excessive concentration of authority may reduce the reliability and transparency of reported financial information. This study contributes to the corporate governance literature by highlighting the role of authority distribution within the boardroom as an important determinant of financial reporting quality. By adopting an institutional logics perspective, this study also provides evidence that governance structures embedded in emerging market environments may shape how executive authority influences reporting practices. Overall, the findings provide important implications for regulators and governance practitioners seeking to strengthen board independence and improve financial reporting quality in Southeast Asian capital markets.