Competition Law and Varieties of Capitalism in the Long Run: The Evolution of Institutional Complementarity, 1890–2010

ABSTRACT Competition law has played a central role in shaping different models of industrial capitalism. Drawing on new competition law indicators spanning 1890–2010, this article examines how competition law has evolved alongside capitalist systems and identifies enduring institutional complementarities between legal regimes and political economies. While competition law has become more stringent in most jurisdictions, the evolution of formal rules and enforcement practices varies systematically across capitalist models. Liberal market economies (LMEs) enforce cartel rules more strictly and are more tolerant of monopoly. Coordinated market economies (CMEs), by contrast, are more permissive of interfirm cooperation and impose stricter constraints on dominant firms. These differences are associated with measures of corporatism, suggesting institutional complementarity between competition regimes and producer group coordination. Overall, the findings show that competition law operates not only as a liberalizing instrument, but also as a key institutional site through which capitalist diversity is reinforced amid long‐term institutional change.