Pricing mechanisms in marine ecological banks under dual objectives and multi-agents

The marine ecological bank is an innovative market-oriented governance mechanism that can address information asymmetry and inefficient matching in marine ecological product markets. However, existing practices reveal constraints in marketization, with pricing mechanisms emerging as a critical yet under-investigated factor influencing the development of marine ecological banks. The present study fills this gap by examining the applicability of two-sided market pricing strategies in marine ecological bank systems. We examine the optimal pricing strategy of marine ecological banks using a modified Hotelling game model. Combining the three distinct pricing models of the existing platform, we construct a pricing model for marine ecological banks under three pricing strategies and numerically validate the model-derived results, which simultaneously optimize profit maximization and social welfare. We obtain three main findings. First, regardless of the adopted pricing approach, four main pricing elements—service costs, intra-network externalities, cross-network externalities, and transaction time—exert consistent effects on the pricing mechanisms for both buyers and sellers. Second, under a two-tier pricing structure, platforms can flexibly adjust registration and transaction fees to accommodate the heterogeneous service demands of different user groups. Third, regulatory authorities should align their oversight with the developmental characteristics of marine ecological banks and implement differentiated regulatory strategies tailored to different growth stages. This study enriches the application scenarios of two-sided market theory. Our findings provide clear guidance for the optimal pricing and operation of marine ecological banks, and offer a feasible path for their development.