Nash equilibria as limits of approximate equilibria of finite games

Abstract We study finite-player normal-form games with compact metric action spaces and bounded Borel measurable payoffs, which need not be continuous. Our main theorem shows that every Nash equilibrium of such a game can be recovered as the limit, in the product weak topology, of $$\varepsilon _n$$ ε n -Nash equilibria of finite restrictions of the game, where $$\varepsilon _n\downarrow 0$$ ε n ↓ 0 and each restriction discretizes the action spaces without changing payoffs. For each player, the finite action sets become dense in the original action space, and the approximating sequence may depend on the prescribed equilibrium. The proof samples from the prescribed equilibrium and uses concentration inequalities to select a realization that approximates it while nearly satisfying all players’ incentive constraints simultaneously. A uniformly vanishing payoff perturbation also makes the constructed profiles exact Nash equilibria of nearby finite games. We provide an example of a continuous game showing that exact equilibria of the unperturbed finite restrictions need not suffice: the game has a Nash equilibrium that is not the limit of Nash equilibria along any sequence of such restrictions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Economic Theory Bulletin
Published
2026-11-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-026-00328-1
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Nash equilibria as limits of approximate equilibria of finite games

Francesc Dilmé
Economic Theory Bulletin
Game Theory and Applications
article

Nash equilibria as limits of approximate equilibria of finite games

Francesc Dilmé
article en

Abstract

Abstract We study finite-player normal-form games with compact metric action spaces and bounded Borel measurable payoffs, which need not be continuous. Our main theorem shows that every Nash equilibrium of such a game can be recovered as the limit, in the product weak topology, of $$\varepsilon _n$$ ε n -Nash equilibria of finite restrictions of the game, where $$\varepsilon _n\downarrow 0$$ ε n ↓ 0 and each restriction discretizes the action spaces without changing payoffs. For each player, the finite action sets become dense in the original action space, and the approximating sequence may depend on the prescribed equilibrium. The proof samples from the prescribed equilibrium and uses concentration inequalities to select a realization that approximates it while nearly satisfying all players’ incentive constraints simultaneously. A uniformly vanishing payoff perturbation also makes the constructed profiles exact Nash equilibria of nearby finite games. We provide an example of a continuous game showing that exact equilibria of the unperturbed finite restrictions need not suffice: the game has a Nash equilibrium that is not the limit of Nash equilibria along any sequence of such restrictions.

Economic Theory BulletinVol. 14(2)
University of Bonn (DE)
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Game Theory and Applications
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