Towards a Thoroughly Kripkean Theory of Proper Name Reference

ABSTRACT In the late 1960s and early 1970s, both Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan challenged descriptivist theories of proper names, arguing that reference—at least in their case—is basically a historical relation. However, as has become increasingly recognised over the past decade, their pictures differ substantially: when confronted with a token of a proper name, Kripke emphasises its historical connection to previous tokens of that name, whereas Donnellan focuses on the mental state of the speaker that leads to its production. In recent years, various philosophers have sought to develop either Kripke's or Donnellan's picture into a theory, often criticising the alternative. The latest development in this debate is found in Jessica Pepp's forthcoming article, ‘Towards a New “Kripke‐Donnellan Theory” of Proper Name Reference’. In this paper, I reconstruct the main stages of the debate and critically assess Pepp's proposed compromise between Kripke's and Donnellan's views on proper name reference. I aim to show, first, that the two views are fundamentally irreconcilable, and, second, that there are compelling reasons to favour Kripke's.