The Application Paradox: How National Officials Perceive Their Role When Applying EU Law

ABSTRACT In multilevel orders such as the European Union (EU), national agencies are responsible for applying laws and policies emanating from multiple institutional levels. This article examines how senior officials in such agencies interpret and rationalise their mandate when applying EU law. Drawing on a mixed‐method design that combines a large‐n survey of senior civil servants with elite interviews, the study analyses the behavioural logics that guide bureaucratic decision‐making related to EU law in Norway. Findings show that officials largely perceive EU law application as a technical, instrumental task guided by professional expertise, while at the same time defending the need for discretion at the national level to enable national expertise adapt rules to national contexts. Prioritising responsiveness to political signals is broadly rejected, whereas attitudes towards the overarching goal of legal harmonisation with other EU/EEA states are ambivalent and varies between respondents. Findings reveal what we term the application paradox : discretion is indispensable for fair and context‐sensitive application of EU law, yet simultaneously creating scope for divergence, bureaucratic self‐programming, an might undermine accountability. Discretion in the context of EU law application emerges as both a safeguard of effective governance and a source of fragmented application.