China’s Stance in United Nations General Assembly Special Emergency Sessions on Ukraine

This study examines China’s stance in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) emergency sessions on Ukraine through the lens of the securitisation theory, situating it within the broader historical trajectory of China’s UNGA practices since its admission in 1971. The study demonstrates that China’s rhetorical strategy is not an isolated response to the Ukraine crisis, but part of a long-standing pattern of ideological securitisation and pragmatic desecuritisation. In the Ukraine debates, China desecuritised the war itself by framing it as a ‘situation’ resolvable through dialogue while securitising systemic threats such as NATO expansion, unilateral sanctions and Cold War mentality. This allowed China to protect its strategic partnership with Russia while upholding UN Charter principles and appeal to the Global South’s concerns. The findings contribute to the securitisation theory by showing that securitisation is best understood diachronically as a repertoire of practices evolving over time and that multilateral forums such as the UNGA function as arenas of normative contestation and coalition-building rather than sites of emergency decision-making. Institutionally, the analysis underscores the UNGA’s role during the Security Council paralysis as a stage for great-power discursive competition.