REFORM STALEMATE ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

This article examines why persistent efforts to reform the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have consistently failed. While this issue has lingered for some time in policy circles and scholarly discussions, the article argues that two principal factors are responsible for hindering meaningful reform: the deep divergence among pro-reformist states and the unyielding reluctance of the United States to endorse dramatic changes. The study employs a qualitative, theory-guided analysis combining historical-institutional and interpretive investigations of UNSC reform debates and proposals, with the U.S. treated as an illustrative case. By tracing the evolution of reform initiatives and identifying the thematic patterns in these proposals, this study emphasizes how four core issues—the Council’s size, its membership category, veto privilege, and equitable regional representation—persist as key points of contention. Building on the analysis of major proposals, these contentious areas are scrutinized to unearth structural and political perplexities involved. Lastly, drawing on realist International Relations (IR) theory, particularly its key conceptual tools of relative gains and hegemony, the paper explains both the fragmentation among pro-reformist states and the strategic calculus behind Washington’s resistance to shifting the established power structure within the UNSC.