THE MODAL DISCIPLINE OF DISTINCTION: a critical–propositional analysis of the article The Error of the Boundary: Why the Concept of the "Limit of Distinguishability" Obstructs Foundational Inquiry, by Petina A. V., in confrontation with the Theory of

This article develops a critical–propositional analysis of Petina A. V.’s The Error of the Boundary: Why the Concept of the “Limit of Distinguishability” Obstructs Foundational Inquiry in systematic confrontation with the Theory of Objectivity (TO), by Vidamor Cabannas and Denivaldo Silva. Its central claim is that the notion of a “limit of distinguishability,” when elevated from a methodological constraint to an ontological verdict, obstructs foundational inquiry by replacing generative explanation with negative stop-tokens such as “indistinguishable,” “inaccessible,” and “ineffable.” The study argues that Petina’s critique is highly relevant to the modal discipline of TO because both approaches reject the absolutization of descriptive, formal, and measurement limits. The article examines major compatibilities between Petina’s architectural methodology and the Theory of Objectivity, especially regarding the genesis, stabilization, and recurrence of distinction, the distinction between phenomenic and ontological levels, and the need to preserve foundational intelligibility without collapsing into speculative obscurity. At the same time, the paper identifies important points of tension. It argues that Petina’s critique challenges TO to clarify with greater rigor the status of concepts such as Nothingness, infinity, the Perfect Sphere, transcendence, Inductive Effects, and the cosmological Eras, so that these are not misread as apophatic substitutes for explanation. In this sense, the confrontation is productive rather than merely oppositional: Petina functions as a methodological critic of verbal closure, while TO offers a broader modal-cosmogonic architecture for the emergence of distinction. The article concludes that the correct alternative to the “error of the boundary” is not the abandonment of ontology, but its modal disciplining. Boundaries must be treated as diagnostics rather than verdicts, and foundational inquiry must return to its proper task: reconstructing the conditions under which distinction, objectivity, measurement, and formalization become possible at all. Keywords: Theory of Objectivity; Petina; limit of distinguishability; modal ontology; foundational inquiry; distinction; boundary; phenomenic elements; Inductive Effects; cosmogony; philosophy of science; ontology of foundations.