I Can’t Define Judiciousness, but I Know It when I Don’t See It

Scholars frequently argue that public perceptions of judicial nominees are shaped by two competing frames; the judiciousness frame focuses on positive aspects of a nominee that meet expectations of a good judge. The ideological frame depicts judges as political actors and is often deployed against nominees. Drawing on legal scholarship that argues that judiciousness may be easier to measure in its absence, we explore a third frame by focusing on departures from ethical expectations. This frame captures a politically potent way to portray nominees that is distinct from their legal qualifications or ideological identification. Using a conjoint experiment, we find evidence that ideological differences reduce support for judicial nominees and evidence that allegations of injudiciousness are an effective third frame that can be used in confirmation politics. Not only does the public consistently recognize and sanction injudicious behavior, but the severity of sanctions for specific injudicious behaviors varies depending on the ideology of those assessing the nominee. By bridging conceptualizations of judiciousness found in judicial politics and legal scholarship, our results highlight the importance of allegations of unethical behavior in how the public perceives individual nominees and possibly the judiciary as a whole.