Governing Money Laundering as a Collective-Action Problem: The European Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)

Abstract Laundering the proceeds of crime presents a fundamental threat to competitive markets, security and the well-being of European consumers. This paper examines the new European Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA), created as part of the 2024 EU AML package to raise supervisory standards and coordinate the fight against illicit finance across the internal market. Drawing on a collective-action perspective, the paper conceptualises AML as the provision of a public good that is undermined by clarity problems (divergent “rules-in-use” and expectations) and credibility problems (uneven likelihood and severity of consequences for non-compliance). It argues that AMLA is best understood as a hybrid decentralised authority that combines classification functions (single rulebook, technical standards, supervisory methodologies, common templates) with selective enforcement tools (direct supervision of high-risk cross-border groups and escalation mechanisms vis-à-vis national authorities), supported by enhanced coordination infrastructures. By framing these features of the EU AML regime as collective-action problems, the paper sheds new light on the strengths and limits of AMLA’s hybrid model for policing money laundering and contributes to wider debates about the effectiveness of AML policing and its role in supporting anti-corruption efforts.