On theological contradiction: responses to d’Agostini, Casati & Fujikawa, DeVito, Gómez Gutiérrez, Joaquin & DeVito, and Reese

Abstract This paper comprises replies to six symposium papers that approach my work from within the philosophy of religion and, in particular, the philosophy of Christian theology: d’Agostini (2024), Casati and Fujikawa (2024), DeVito (2023), Gómez Gutiérrez (2023), Joaquin and DeVito (2023), and Reese (2023). Each paper raises questions concerning the role of a subclassical — in particular, glut-theoretic (and, in some cases, gap-theoretic) — account of consequence in modelling the apparent contradictions at the heart of orthodox Christian theology. The aim in what follows is not to settle broader debates about divine attributes, free will, or conciliar authority, but to clarify how a modest logical base (here taken to be FDE), together with theory-specific vocabulary as needed, interacts with and supports a contradictory theology. Each section may be read independently; together they emphasise a common theme: the logic of theology is sparse and topic-neutral, while the theology itself may be rich, extralogical, and in some cases genuinely contradictory. I am deeply grateful to each author for their insightful contributions.