The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations.

Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a "private solution" such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

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Publication Details

Journal
Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern
Published
2026-03-23
DOI
https://doi.org/10.48620/96291
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
Type
article
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article

The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations.

Eugene Malthouse, Rene Schwaiger, Lu Dong, Laila Nockur et al.
Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations.

Eugene Malthouse, Rene Schwaiger, Lu Dong, Laila Nockur, Miguel Carriquiry, Michela Accerenzi, Guillaume Hollard, Dániel Horn, Omar Sene, Lionel Page, Alessandro Tavoni, Rostislav Staněk, Lingbo Huang, Sarah Spycher, Hubert János Kiss, Wooyoung Lim, Alexis Belianin, Doruk İriş, Fei Song, Antonios Proestakis, Martine Visser, Filippos Exadaktylos, Syngjoo Choi, Swagata Bhattacharjee, Joseph Tao‐yi Wang, Amanda Wijayanti, Muhammad Ryan Sanjaya, Thomas T. Hills, Antal Ertl, Sarah Lynn Flecke, Vera Te Velde, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Muhammad Ashraf, Wei Zhen, Mihir Bhattacharya, Eduardo Ezekiel Denzon, T. Y. Cliff Leung, Norman Tanchingco, Max Baard, Antonio Alfonso, Martin Leites, Ali Ozkes, Meike Morren, Osbert Kwabena Boadi Kwarteng, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Junghyun Park, Charles Yaw Okyere, Willy Wang, Giorgio Dini, Teresa Garcia-Muñoz, Bartlomiej Dessoulavy-Sliwinski, Mapi Ramos-Sosa, Gwen-Jiro Clochard, Rana Umair Ashraf, Carlos Ramos, John Wooders, Fabio Galeotti, Mayada Oudah, Jaromír Kovářík, Wei-Chien Weng, María José Vázquez-De Francisco, Juan-Camilo Cárdenas, Juliane Koch, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Charlie Pilgrim, Katharina Werner, Ralph Winkler, Li Ying, Sanchayan Banerjee, Daniel Sgroi, Andreas Lange, Stefan Pfattheicher
article en

Abstract

Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a "private solution" such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

Open Access CRIS of the University of Bern
Institut für ökologische Wirtschaftsforschung (AT)
Climate action
Openalex Percentile: Top 16%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
DOIOpen Access PDFOpenAlex
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