Experts, virtuous and vicious: the case for virtue metasemantics

Many externalists accept that experts play a privileged role in determining linguistic meanings. It’s widely assumed that the experts in question are those members of the language community who have specialized knowledge in the domain relevant to a term’s extension. Putnam, (Midwest Stud Philos Sci 7:131–193, 1975; Burge, Foundations of mind: philosophical essays. Clarendon Press, 2007; Jackman, Pac Philos Q 8:365–380, 2005; Goldberg, Nous 43(4):581–598, 2009; Sawyer, Proc Aristot Soc 118(2):127–147, 2018) Recent work in nonideal philosophy of language has challenged this view, arguing that non-experts often seem to give semantic deference instead to demagogues and charlatans. Engelhardt and Campbell, (J Appl Philos 36(2):298–312, 2019; Anderson, Fem Philos Q 6(3), 2020; Hesni, The routledge handbook of non-ideal theory. Routledge, 2024; Engelhardt, Nonideal theory and content externalism. Oxford University Press, 2024). This paper considers the options for justifying the received view on experts, or what Derek Ball has called “virtue metasemantics” (VM). Ball, (Ratio 33(4): 206-219, 2020a). After motivating the challenge from nonideal theorists, we consider whether VM can be saved by an appeal to reference magnetism (Sect. 3), reflective equilibrium (Sect. 4), or temporal externalism (Sect. 5). For each, we sketch doubts, possible replies, and work to be done.