The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations

Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a "private solution" such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

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Journal
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2026-03-20
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2504632123
Primary Topic
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
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article
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article

The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations

John Wooders, Wei‐Chien Weng, Eugene Malthouse, Rene Schwaiger et al.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
article

The private solution trap in collective action problems across 34 nations

John Wooders, Wei‐Chien Weng, Eugene Malthouse, Rene Schwaiger, Lu Dong, Sanchayan Banerjee, Martí­n Leites, Lin Ying, Mayada Oudah, Laila Nockur, Ralph Winkler, Miguel Carriquiry, Michela Accerenzi, Guillaume Hollard, Dániel Horn, Nobuyuki Hanaki, Omar Sene, Rana Umair Ashraf, Lionel Page, Alessandro Tavoni, Katharina Werner, Ann-Kathrin Lange, Rostislav Staněk, Lingbo Huang, Sarah Spycher, María José Vázquez-De Francisco, Hubert János Kiss, Wooyoung Lim, Alexis Belianin, Doruk İriş, Fei Song, Antonios Proestakis, Martine Visser, Gwen-Jirō Clochard, Jaromír Kovářík, Filippos Exadaktylos, Syngjoo Choi, Fabio Galeotti, Swagata Bhattacharjee, Joseph Tao‐yi Wang, Amanda Wijayanti, Muhammad Ryan Sanjaya, Thomas T. Hills, Carlos Arturo Londoño Ramos, Antal Ertl, Sarah Lynn Flecke, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Muhammad Ashraf, Wei Zhen, Juan-Camilo Cárdenas Cárdenas, Mihir Bhattacharya, Eduardo Ezekiel Denzon, T. Y. Cliff Leung, Norman Tanchingco, Max Baard, Antonio Alfonso, Ali Ozkes, Vera te Velde, Meike Morren, Osbert Kwabena Boadi Kwarteng, Daniel Sgroi, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Junghyun Park, Charles Yaw Okyere, Willy Wang, Stefan Pfattheicher, Giorgio Dini, Teresa Garcia-Muñoz, Charlie Pilgrim, Bartlomiej Dessoulavy-Sliwinski, Mapi Ramos-Sosa, Juliane Koch
article en

Abstract

Collective action problems emerge when individual incentives and group interests are misaligned, as in the case of climate change. Individuals involved in these problems are generally considered to have two options: contribute toward public solutions such as global warming mitigation or free ride. However, many collective action problems today involve a third option of investing in a "private solution" such as local adaptation. The availability of this third option can lead to a private solution trap whereby private solutions are adopted, collectively optimal public solutions are not provided, and existing inequalities are exacerbated. We investigated the private solution trap with a collective action game featuring private and public solutions, wealth inequality determined by luck or merit, and participants from 34 countries. We found that the joint existence of private solutions and wealth inequality had a consistent effect across countries: Participants given a higher endowment adopted private solutions almost twice as often as those given a lower endowment, regardless of whether it was determined by luck or merit, and contributed proportionally less toward public solutions. Wealth inequality increased in every country and those given lower endowments were often left unprotected as public solutions were not provided. Across countries, cultural values of hierarchy and harmony were associated with preferences for private and public solutions, respectively. We also identified two universal pathways toward public solution provision: early contributions and conditional cooperation. Our findings highlight the ubiquity of the private solution trap, its cultural underpinnings, and its potential consequences for global collective action problems.

Proceedings of the National Academy of SciencesVol. 123(12)
Vienna University of Economics and Business (AT), Almaty Management University (KZ), National Research University Higher School of Economics (RU), Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ES), New York University Abu Dhabi (AE), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR), Oeschger Centre for Climate Change Research (CH), University of Leeds (GB), University of Arizona (US), Seoul National University (KR), University of Nottingham (GB), Osaka University of Economics (JP), Sogang University (KR), Shandong University (CN), University of Cape Town (ZA), Universität Hamburg (DE), Corvinus University of Budapest (HU), The University of Queensland (AU), Universitas Gadjah Mada (ID), University of Iceland (IS), National Taiwan University (TW), University of the Basque Country (ES), Universidad de Granada (ES), Universidad de la República de Uruguay (UY), University of Cologne (DE), University of Passau (DE), Universität Innsbruck (AT), Universidad de Lima (PE), Ateneo de Manila University (PH), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN), Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HK), Aarhus University (DK), Masaryk University (CZ), Universidad Loyola Andalucía (ES), University of Massachusetts Amherst (US), Hamburg School of Business Administration (DE), Mediterranean University (ME), University of Michigan (US), Southern University of Science and Technology (CN), Institute for Government (GB), Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (DO), Ashoka University (IN), University of Warwick (GB), Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Économie, Gestion (FR), Limassol General Hospital (CY), Universidad Loyola (BO), O. P. Jindal Global University (IN), University of Economics and Management (CZ), Université Alioune Diop de Bambey (SN), Universidad de Los Andes (BO), Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Psychology (CZ), ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HU), University College London (GB), University of Warsaw (PL), Toronto Metropolitan University (CA), New York University (US), University of Maryland, College Park (US), Universitat de Barcelona (ES), Rogers (United States) (US), Universidad de Sevilla (ES), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (NL), Université Jean Monnet (FR), Agricultural & Applied Economics Association (US), Global University (LB), London School of Economics and Political Science (GB), University of West Bohemia in Pilsen (CZ), University of Bologna (IT), Hunan Institute of Technology (CN)
Climate action
Openalex Percentile: Top 18%
Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
DOIOpen Access PDFOpenAlex
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