The Limits of Temporal Representation

This paper argues for a new way of approaching metaphysical problems of time by reexamining the concept of time through the lens of the representational theory of mind and Kantian epistemology. As an example of such problems, it examines the historical debate over whether time is discrete or continuous by drawing parallels between Zeno’s paradoxes and Kant’s antinomies. I argue that there are good reasons to treat certain properties of time as projections of the mind, supported by insights from both cognitive science and phenomenology. Building on this foundation, I introduce the term specious event to designate what exists in our representational world as ontological constituents. I further argue that examining different forms of representation reveals a hierarchical structure in the contents of the world, allowing a clear distinction between three categories of representation: first-level, second-level, and higher-level representations. From this perspective, moments of time are shown to be higher-level representations; they are not constituents of the world but interpretive tools projected onto it. The question “Is time continuous or discrete?” is therefore a category mistake, reflecting the limits of our representational framework rather than a genuine metaphysical property of time.