Shared Reality as a Condition of Disclosure: Coherence, Constraint, and the Possibility of Finite Description

This paper argues that finite disclosure, substantive disagreement, descriptive misfit, and correction presuppose a sufficiently shared and non-fragmented reality. It defends a modest but robust shared-reality thesis: reality must be common and constraint-bearing enough for multiple finite renderings to answer to one target, even though no single rendering can be presumed to exhaust that target. The paper develops this claim through a condition-of-disclosure argument and distinguishes shared reality from both maximal monism and mere practical coordination. It also separates ontological commonality from the idea that one final vocabulary could fully capture reality. Along the way, the paper situates itself in relation to scientific realism, perspectival and plural realist approaches, and applies the framework to scientific model plurality, institutional representation, and epistemic injustice. The result is an upstream ontological and disclosure-theoretic proposal: shared reality is not an optional addition to finite description, but one of its conditions.