Pliny’s dynastic paradoxes: The theory and practice of succession in the <i>Panegyricus</i>

ABSTRACT This article reads paragraph seven of Pliny’s Panegyricus as a theoretical critique of adoption and hereditary succession. In this section of the speech Pliny foregrounds analysis over narrative or description as he compares the circumstances of Trajan’s adoption with the most relevant examples of imperial succession from Augustus to Domitian. The result of this comparison is a suite of general principles recommending adoption of the best citizen, rather than genealogy or adoption within the imperial household, as the best means of succession. Pliny’s ‘theoretical model’ is then compared with his narrative of Trajan’s adoption and accession. Pliny’s theory and Trajan’s adoption are shown to differ in important respects. Pliny vacillates between presenting Nerva as a central or marginal figure in Trajan’s adoption. He obfuscates the notion of Nerva’s unique choice of Trajan by suggesting the involvement of further agents in Trajan’s rise to power, such as the gods; and Pliny insinuates a wider involvement of human stakeholders at Rome: the court, the senate, and the Roman people.