Legal-institutional Prematurity of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' During the Prabowo Cabinet

This study analyzes the legal and institutional aspects of the establishment of the National Investment Fund 'Danantara' during the early period of Prabowo Subianto's administration. The approach used is juridical-normative with doctrinal content analysis of primary regulations regarding the establishment and governance of Danantara supported by a systematic literature review combined with a comparative mapping of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) practices and the GAPP (Santiago Principles). Evaluation indicators include: legal basis and certainty of status, institutional design and lines of accountability, governance (composition and functions of boards/committees, checks and balances), transparency and auditing, clarity of investment mandates and role separation, risk management including ESG, and control of conflicts of interest. The results indicate three clusters of weaknesses: (i) legal absence of lex specialis and clear fiscal ring-fencing; (ii) institutional overlapping authorities of the government, Investment Management Agency, and Danantara, as well as weak independent oversight; and (iii) practice limitations in proactive reporting, the non-operational status of ESG policies, and inadequate conflict of interest regulations. The conclusion emphasizes the prematurity of Danantara as a reliable state investment entity. Recommendations include a legislative roadmap towards lex specialis, clarification of mandate demarcation, mandatory periodic public reporting, independent external audits, mainstreaming ESG based on indicators, and strengthening the conflict of interest prevention regime.