Intuition and reason in the history of ethics : from moral philosophy to moral psychology

This paper follows the dispute over the role of intuition and reason in ethics through-out the history of the discipline. It moves from Socratic intellectualism and Aristotle’s account of character formation, through medieval debates on will and conscience and the early modern conflict between rationalists and sentimentalists, to nineteenth-cen-tury challenges from utilitarianism, evolutionary theory, and the genealogical cri-tiques of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. It closes with twentieth-century developments in empirical moral psychology. This review refers to the dual-process framework, which distinguishes between Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Moral attitudes are rela-tively stable evaluations. They tend to produce quick, affective responses without de-liberation. Moral norms, by contrast, are clear and expressible statements about what is required, forbidden, or permitted. Attitudes fit fast, automatic Type 1 judgments, while norms guide slower, more reflective Type 2 thinking. However, internalized norms can become increasingly automatic over time, and sustained reflection can re-shape attitudes. The paper concludes that intuition and reason are not competing sources of moral truth, but complementary ways of processing the same moral con-tent.