The Nature of Compensation for Moral Damage: Between Personal Attachment and Transferability (A Comparative Study)

Moral damage is considered one of the most controversial forms of harm due to its intrinsic connection to the injured person and its immaterial nature. The evolution of civil liability doctrines has led to the emergence of a trend recognizing the transferability of the right to compensation arising from moral damage after it was previously regarded as a purely person right, inherently attached to its holder. This shift raises profound legal questions regarding the foundation of such a right and its consistency with the general principles of civil liability, particularly in cases where the injured party dies before initiating a claim, obtaining a judgment or reaching a settlement with the liable party. The signification of this issue is further amplified by the legislative, doctrinal, and judicial divergences among comparative legal systems, necessitating an analytical study of the nature of this right and its practical implications. This research relies on the descriptive analytical comparative approach as a basic methodological framework. It will study the legislative texts related to the permissibility of transferring the right to compensation for moral damages related to the person affected, according to the civil law in both Iraq and France. A comparative analysis of the main legal systems will be conducted, supported by judicial decisions, to determine practical trends, while addressing Egyptian law and judiciary in more than one place.