Rethinking energy security in policy making: A taxonomy for justified securitisation

Energy security has become a dominant organising principle in energy policy, yet there is no clear criterion for when framing energy issues as matters of ‘security’ is justified. This Perspective draws on securitisation theory, which understands ‘security’ not as a descriptive label but as a framing process through which actors present an issue as an existential threat, thereby legitimising exceptional measures. It argues that securitisation of energy is normatively defensible only when two conditions derived from the core effects of securitisation are met: (1) time-criticality: the situation requires immediate intervention to prevent major harm; and (2) governance fit: existing institutions cannot adequately address the problem within ordinary mandates and timescales. Combining these dimensions, the article develops a two-dimensional taxonomy distinguishing between routine risks, structural vulnerabilities, operational disturbances, and acute emergencies. This taxonomy provides a practical decision grid for policy makers and analysts to evaluate when security framing is appropriate and when it risks distorting energy governance. By shifting the debate from defining energy security to evaluating its justified use, this Perspective offers a conceptual tool to discipline security language and improve analytical and policy clarity in energy governance.