Towards a Phenomenological Understanding of Disembodiment in Schizophrenia

The aim of this paper is to analyse the experience of disembodiment in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. Given that disembodiment is characterized by a diminished sense of body ownership, it is usually interpreted in a Cartesian manner as involving a mind-body dichotomy. Contrary to this view, firstly, I argue that the dualist interpretation of disembodiment is phenomenologically untenable, because it is incompatible with experiencing one’s alienation in an embodied way. Secondly, I endorse the interpretation of body disownership in terms of multisensory disintegration, and provide a Husserlian reading of this experience by distinguishing among distinct senses of spatiality that are specific to different sense-fields. Specifically, I claim that distinct sense-fields harbour particular centres of orientation, and thus a split between these sense-fields leaves the subject with the discordant sense of inhabiting different points of orientation. Thirdly, I focus on the perturbed sense of spatiality that arises from (i) a vision that is extricated from touch, and (ii) a touch that disengages from vision. Finally, I conclude by stating some limitations of this article, while also suggesting some prospects for further advancements.