The Permission Paradox: Condoning Deception Can Promote Honesty in Young Children

The capacity to deceive is a hallmark of cognitive sophistication. Researchers often use games requiring deception to study the development of this capacity, assuming such games effectively isolate the cognitive aspects from sociomoral considerations. In three studies we challenge this assumption by explicitly giving 36- to 83-month-old Singaporean children (N = 279) permission to deceive in such a game. We initially hypothesized that granting such permission would increase deception by reducing sociomoral concerns associated with deception. Instead, we found the opposite effect: children were less likely to deceive. This paradoxical effect was replicated, suggesting that moral considerations persist even in contexts where ethical guidelines are presumed to be suspended and that the cognitive and moral aspects of deception are deeply intertwined during early development. SUMMARY: Children were less likely to deceive in a strategic game when they are explicitly given permission to deceive. Young children still view deception games through a moral lens, even though such games provide a context where deception is normative. Cognitive and moral aspects of deception are deeply intertwined starting early in life.

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Publication Details

Journal
Developmental Science
Published
2026-03-11
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.70168
Primary Topic
Child and Animal Learning Development
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

The Permission Paradox: Condoning Deception Can Promote Honesty in Young Children

Xiao Pan Ding, Chadmen Tan, Gail D. Heyman
Developmental Science
Child and Animal Learning Development
article

The Permission Paradox: Condoning Deception Can Promote Honesty in Young Children

Xiao Pan Ding, Chadmen Tan, Gail D. Heyman
article en

Abstract

The capacity to deceive is a hallmark of cognitive sophistication. Researchers often use games requiring deception to study the development of this capacity, assuming such games effectively isolate the cognitive aspects from sociomoral considerations. In three studies we challenge this assumption by explicitly giving 36- to 83-month-old Singaporean children (N = 279) permission to deceive in such a game. We initially hypothesized that granting such permission would increase deception by reducing sociomoral concerns associated with deception. Instead, we found the opposite effect: children were less likely to deceive. This paradoxical effect was replicated, suggesting that moral considerations persist even in contexts where ethical guidelines are presumed to be suspended and that the cognitive and moral aspects of deception are deeply intertwined during early development. SUMMARY: Children were less likely to deceive in a strategic game when they are explicitly given permission to deceive. Young children still view deception games through a moral lens, even though such games provide a context where deception is normative. Cognitive and moral aspects of deception are deeply intertwined starting early in life.

Developmental ScienceVol. 29(3)
National University of Singapore (SG), University of California San Diego (US)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 27%
Child and Animal Learning Development
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