Non-compliance with EU environmental law: Rational choice or a necessity? The case of Greece

• Non-compliance is a strategic choice for renegotiating implementation of EU legislation. • Member states balance penalties against compliance costs to delay implementation. • Symbolic compliance enables flexible norms through extended negotiations. • Greece paid €71 M in fines over 11 years for non-complying with the Waste Directive. • Public data access on non-compliance is essential for policy assessment. The European Union (EU) has established infringement proceedings to encourage member states to comply with European environmental legislation. Nevertheless, non-compliance remains a significant challenge for EU member states. This study examines the enforcement procedure under Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), focusing on the case study of illegal landfills in Greece. Compliance with European environmental legislation is occasionally tactical, as member states often act strategically to minimize non-compliance costs by delaying action through prolonged official communications and negotiating implementation terms. In some cases, paying penalties is more cost-effective than immediate full compliance. Greece paid €71 million in fines over eleven years while gradually closing illegal landfills, demonstrating that non-compliance can be a rational economic choice. This pattern results in lengthy, customized infringement procedures according to member states’ strategies, enabling adherence to more flexible norms.