Game-Theoretic Analysis of Green Emission Reduction in Financially Constrained Dual-Channel Seafood Supply Chain: The Role of E-Commerce Platform Investment

This study investigates the optimal pricing and green investment strategies within a dual-channel seafood supply chain comprising a seafood manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, where the manufacturer faces capital constraints. In response to the emerging model of e-commerce platform financing, we develop a Stackelberg game model to analyze two scenarios: single green investment (by the manufacturer only) and joint green investment (by both the manufacturer and the platform). We derive the equilibrium decisions for both parties under each scenario. The results indicate that enhanced market competitiveness of the direct sales channel increases the manufacturer’s wholesale revenue from the self-operated channel and its direct sales revenue, while also enabling the platform to achieve higher profits through a premium pricing strategy. Furthermore, the choice of green investment mode is contingent upon the intensity of channel competition and the platform’s commission rate. Specifically, when both parameters are low, a single green investment strategy constitutes an equilibrium. Conversely, when direct channel competition is sufficiently intense, a joint green investment strategy emerges as the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, leading to a win–win outcome regardless of the commission rate. These findings offer actionable insights for managers of seafood companies and e-commerce platforms in formulating sustainable channel cooperation and financing strategies.