“We are just like ploughing bulls”: a comparative analysis of power relations and cooperation in Fulani and Mossi polygynous households in Burkina Faso

Abstract Polygynous households constitute a significant share of agricultural producers in sub-Saharan Africa, which can influence productivity and food security through intrahousehold cooperation. Economic analyses often focus on the outcomes of cooperation while overlooking the diverse institutional mechanisms that shape it. This study aims to address this gap by analysing cooperation within polygynous households as a collective action problem using an adapted version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork with Fulani and Mossi communities in rural Burkina Faso—which includes participant observation, focus group discussions, Net-Maps, and semi-structured interviews— we examine how rules-in-use shape cooperation regarding agricultural production in polygynous households. Our findings indicate that cooperative outcomes reflect distinct institutional arrangements. Rather than emerging solely from aligned interests, the feasibility of cooperation depends on specific configurations of institutional rules; while some arrangements facilitate collective action by reducing bargaining costs and reinforcing accountability, others—such as rigid gendered taboos—impose institutional barriers that preclude cooperation. In Mossi households, spousal cooperation is driven by mutual dependence and structured incentives. By contrast, in Fulani households, gendered taboos create institutional constraints that lead to an involuntary lack of spousal cooperation. However, this lack of cooperation does not extend to all intrahousehold relations; Fulani co-wives collaborate effectively on private plots enabled by pre-agreed income use and equal sharing norms. This differs sharply from Mossi co-wives who rarely cooperate, due to unequal payoff rules linked to seniority and a lack of formal mechanisms for joint decision-making. These findings demonstrate that cooperation is shaped by the interaction of institutional rules with gender norms, hierarchies, and labour expectations. Consequently, agricultural policies that aim to enhance agricultural productivity and equity must account for this institutional diversity, particularly the varying roles of male provisioning, female autonomy, and collective work.