Democratic self-defence as a dirty hands problem

“Dirty hands” is a problem in political ethics that emerges when political actors, faced with urgent circumstances, engage in moral wrongdoing to better serve the public interest. Does containing autocrats justify morally troubling actions akin to dirty hands, and if so, under what conditions? One example is militant democracy, where restrictions on individual rights are considered justified to block antidemocratic actors, but are morally harmful nonetheless. This article identifies structural similarities between dirty hands and democratic self-defence and analyses how normative theorizing about the former can guide approaches to the latter. It discusses the limits of consequentialist and deontological responses in both cases, and why acting in the public interest helps understand and address the problem. The article argues that democracy defenders should consider whether threats to democracy are a result of coercion and carry the prospect of substantial or acute public harm. They should also consider whether the threat of harm is factually certain and sufficiently severe to merit action that causes “collateral moral damage”. It concludes by suggesting how to assess whether moral transgressions are truly necessary and excusable in protecting democracy and argues for rethinking the moral costs of democratic self-defence.