Methodological Naturalism for Philosophy: Insights from Wittgenstein

Abstract This paper seeks to contribute to the ongoing debates about methodological naturalism in philosophy by examining the interpretations of Wittgenstein as a naturalist philosopher. Through analyzing these interpretations, I characterize Wittgenstein’s position as a rare kind of naturalism independent of ontological or metaphysical claims. I show that what makes Wittgenstein’s naturalism methodological is its metaphilosophical thrust, which I exemplify in two interrelated features of Wittgenstein’s thought. First, the idea of philosophy’s radical autonomy prevents philosophy from committing itself to any metaphysical thesis. Second, the emphasis that Wittgenstein places on the descriptiveness of philosophy makes “general facts of nature” not the material of observation but the hinges of philosophy. Naturalism in Wittgenstein’s thought, I argue, is the precondition for philosophy as opposed to science. Since Wittgenstein’s naturalism is metaphilosophical, it is methodological: it prevents a philosopher from adopting the supernatural positions embodied in metaphysical theses. Thus, the proposed interpretation not only refines dominant views of Wittgenstein’s naturalism as liberal or liberating, but also adds to the diversity of naturalistic positions in philosophy.