Values in Radical Behaviorism and Functional Contextualism: Agreement, Divergence, Contradiction, or Complementarity?

Abstract The concept of values was first introduced into behavior-analytic literature by B. F. Skinner and later expanded by S. C. Hayes and colleagues. Today, values constitute a central component of acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) and play a key role in contextual behavioral therapies and other evidence-based interventions. In the broader literature, radical behaviorism and functional contextualism are often presented as complementary or divergent approaches, but rarely as theoretically incompatible. Although discussions of values appear across these traditions, the specific relationship between their conceptualizations has remained largely unexamined. This article offers a conceptual analysis of how values are defined within radical behaviorism and functional contextualism. To accomplish this, we reviewed publications from both traditions with a specific focus on the theme of values and organized our comparative analysis around four categories: agreement, divergence, contradiction, and complementarity. Our review identified one area of agreement, three areas of divergence, three areas of direct contradiction, and explored the possibility of complementarity. These findings suggest that the two approaches offer conceptually incompatible accounts of values, with significant implications for theory, research, and clinical practice. Conceptual precision in defining values can reduce ambiguity and support more effective action, aligning CBS with its goals of predicting and influencing behavior. Moreover, each definition of values embeds implicit normative commitments that shape the community’s practices. Understanding the functional consequences of each formulation, therefore, is not a matter of determining which definition is “correct” in a realist or empiricist sense, but of evaluating which definition best serves the purposes and interests of the behavior-analytic community.