Design‐Based Politicization in Non‐Majoritarian Institutions: The Case of the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board

ABSTRACT Non‐majoritarian institutions are designed to depoliticize policymaking and enhance the credibility of regulatory decisions. Yet many such bodies have become sites of contestation, exposing the limits of technocratic insulation. While research highlights external and behavioral drivers of politicization, the role of institutional design features in shaping this process remains underexplored. This article develops the concept of design‐based politicization to explain how structural features intended to depoliticize decision‐making can instead generate conflict. Drawing on interview and document material, it examines the European Commission's Regulatory Scrutiny Board as a critical case of technocratic oversight in regulatory governance. The analysis identifies three design‐related mechanisms for politicization: delegation ambiguity, mandate contradictions, and weak throughput legitimacy. Politicization may thus stem not only from external pressures or poor performance but from specific institutional design features, thereby revealing the contradictions of depoliticization and clarifying when and why technocratic oversight bodies become contested within and beyond Europe.