Strategic power-sharing in authoritarian regimes: The role of elections and preferential benefits

Following a wave of post–Cold War democratization, many regimes have adopted electoral institutions while maintaining authoritarian rule—a trend that raises new questions about the sources of authoritarian resilience. This writing examines how autocrats in electoral authoritarian regimes survive through symbolic power-sharing and providing preferential benefits (corruption and rents). However, the power-sharing mechanism itself is a paradox; it functions for dictators only when it can reduce the threat coming from rivals, and rivals are important only when they have enough coercive capacity to overthrow the dictator. While autocrats must offer enough benefits to deter defection, excessive provision of these benefits risk fueling popular unrest or enabling rivals to consolidate power. To manage this tension, regimes rely on benefit distribution and selective purges, particularly in moments of crisis. I test two hypotheses that the combination of multiparty elections and preferential benefits enhances regime stability; and that the provision of such benefits is constrained by the risk purges and crisis moment. Thus, these benefits serve as a tool to reduce rivals’ autonomous threat capacity. The findings offer a formal explanation for the resilience of electoral authoritarian regimes across diverse political contexts.